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A Decidable Predicate Logic of Knowledge
Abstract
The language we consider is that of classical first order logic augmented with the unary modal operator
□. Sentences of this language are regarded as true or false in a knowledge-base KB, which is any finite
set of □-free formulas. Truth of □α in KB is understood as that α is true in all classical models of KB and
this interpretation is intended to capture the intuition "we know that α" behind □α.
The resulting logic is, in general, undecidable and not even semidecidable. However, there is a natural
fragment of the above language, called the constructive language, which yields a decidable logic. The
only syntactic constraint in the constructive language is that there exists x should always be followed by
□. That is, we are not allowed to simply say "there is x such that ..." and we can only say "there is x for
which we know that ...". Under this constraint, truth of there existsxα(x) will always imply that an object x
for which α(x) holds not only exists, but can be effectively found. This is generally what we want of there
exists in practical applications: knowing that "there exists a combination c that opens safe S" has no
significance unless such a combination c can actually be found, which, in our semantics, will be
equivalent to saying that there is c for which we know that c opens S. So, it is only truth of the sentence
there existsc□OPENS(c,S) that really matters, and the latter, unlike there existsc□OPENS(c,S) is a
perfectly legal formula of the constructive language.
I introduce a decidable sequent system C K N in the constructive language and prove its soundness and
completeness with respect to the above semantics.
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Abstract

The language we consider is that of classical rst order logic augmented with the unary modal operator 2. Sentences of this language
are regarded as true or false in a knowledge-base KB , which is any
nite set of 2-free formulas. Truth of 2 in KB is understood as
that is true in all classical models of KB , and this interpretation is
intended to capture the intuition \we know that " behind 2 .
The resulting logic is, in general, undecidable and not even semidecidable. However, there is a natural fragment of the above language,
called the constructive language, which yields a decidable logic. The
only syntactic constraint in the constructive language is that 9x should
always be followed by 2. That is, we are not allowed to simply say
\there is x such that ...", and we can only say \there is x for which
we know that ...". Under this constraint, truth of 9x (x) will always
imply that an object x for which (x) holds not only exists, but can
The author is grateful for support from the University of Pennsylvania, the National
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be eectively found. This is generally what we want of 9 in practical
applications: knowing that \there exists a combination c that opens
safe S " has no signi cance unless such a combination c can actually
be found, which, in our semantics, will be equivalent to saying that
there is c for which we know that c opens S . So, it is only truth
of the sentence 9c2OP ENS (c S ) that really matters, and the latter,
unlike 9c OP ENS (c S ), is a perfectly legal formula of the constructive
language.
I introduce a decidable sequent system CKN in the constructive
language and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to
the above semantics.

1 Introduction
The nonconstructive character of classical existential quantier has many
times been criticized. Letting alone the philosophy on the right of \existence"
of the classical notion of existence, I will only point out that it has no practical
meaning. Consider the sentence
9cOPENS (c

S)

asserting that there is a combination c that opens safe S . Knowing that this
sentence is true has little signicance unless we can actually nd a particular
combination which opens S . In other words, there must be a combination
C such that we know that OPENS (C S ) is true. This can be expressed by
the sentence
9c2OPENS (c S )
where 2 is read as \we know that...".
This consideration suggests an idea how to make classical rst order logic
constructive and practically meaningful: rst add to the language of the
latter a knowledge operator 2, and then restrict the resulting language by
allowing usage of quantiers only in combination with 2 as in the above
example. That is, we should not be allowed to simply say \there is x such
that ...", and we can only say \there is x for which we know that ...".
On the second thought, existential quantier is nothing but a \big disjunction", and one might ask the question why we don't impose similar re2

strictions on the usage of _. The point is that the disjunction

OPENS (C 1 S ) _ OPENS (C 2 S )
although not as good as

2OPENS (C 1 S ) _ 2OPENS (C 2 S )
is still reasonably constructive as it envisages only a bounded number of (in
particular, two) possibilities if this disjunction is true, all we need to do to
open S is to try both combinations C 1 and C 2, whereas knowing the truth
of 9cOPENS (c S ) doesn't save our day unless dialing innitely many, or,
say, 2100 combinations, is feasible.
Our approach, on one hand, extends the expressive power of classical rst
order logic by adding the knowledge operator to it and, on the other hand,
restricts some expressiveness of the latter by limiting the usage of quantiers
as I tried to convince the reader, however, this restriction can be viewed as
just cleansing classical logic of practically meaningless constructs.
Most importantly, as we will see later, our approach induces a decidable
predicate logic, which nicely contrasts with the undecidability of classical
logic, to say nothing about the non-semidecidability of the syntactic logics
of knowledge ( 3]) or epistemic logics studied within the framework of nonmonotonic logics ( 1], 2]).

2 The full language
We start by dening the syntax and semantics of the full language L of the
predicate modal logic of knowledge.
L has an innite set V of variables, a nonempty (nite or innite) set
C of constants and a nonempty (nite or innite) set R of predicate letters
together with a function that assigns to every R 2 R a natural number called
the arity of R. We also dene the set of terms as V  C .
The set of formulas of L is the smallest set of expressions such that:
 R(t1 : : : tn ) is an (atomic) formula, for any n-ary relation symbol R 2
R and any terms t1 : : : tn
 if  is a formula, then :() is a formula
3

if  and  are formulas, then () _ ( ) is a formula
 if  is a formula, then 2() is a formula
 if  is a formula and x is a variable, then 9x() is a formula.
When this does not lead to confusions, we will be omitting some parentheses in formulas.
We will be using ^, !, $, 8, 3 (where 3 = :2:) as dened operators.
We also adopt the following standard notational convention: If (x1 : : : xn)
denotes a formula, where the xi are variables (which do not necessarily have
to have free occurrence in the formula, as well as not all free variables of the
formula have to be among x1 : : : xn), then (t1 : : : tn), where the ti are
terms, denotes the result of substituting each (free occurrence of each) xi by
ti in (x1 : : : xn).
Formulas without free variables will be called sentences, and formulas not
containing 2 will be said to be pure.
If (x1 : : : xn) is a formula with exactly x1 : : : xn free and c1 : : : cn are
constants, then (c1 : : : cn) is said to be an instance of (x1 : : : xn).


De nition 2.1 A world is a function w which assigns to each atomic sen-

tence R(~c) one of the values fT (rue) F (alse)g. We write j=w  for w() = T .
The relation j=w is extended to all pure sentences in the following way:
 j=w : i 6j=w 
 j=w  _  i j=w  or j=w 
 j=w 9x(x) i there is a constant c such that j=w (c).
Thus, a world w is nothing but a classical structure with the universe C
and, for a pure sentence , j=w  means nothing but that  is classically
true in this structure. Note the two simplifying assumptions we make vs
the traditional approach: First, we assume that every object of the universe
has a unique name in our language (a constant). Second, we identify these
objects with their names. These assumptions make life much easier.

De nition 2.2 A knowledge-base is a nite (possibly empty) set of pure
formulas.
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De nition 2.3 A world w is said to be a possible world for a knowledge-base

KB i for every instance  of every  2 KB , j=w  . This means nothing
but that w, as a classical structure, is a model of KB .
0

0

A knowledge-base KB is said to be consistent i it has at least one
possible world, and KB is complete i it has at most one possible world.
Intuitively, the knowledge-base is all our knowledge of the world. This
knowledge is usually only partial unless the knowledge-base is complete. Different possible worlds correspond to dierent possible completions of the
missing information, and they are equal candidates to be the (real) world.
The reason why we don't allow non-pure formulas in a knowledge-base
is simple: the denition of the exact semantics of 2 as a knowledge operator is going to appeal to what is contained in our knowledge-base, and
including formulas containing 2 in the latter would make that kind of denition intuitively circular. Also, we want our knowledge-base to contain only
objective information | information about the outside world such information is stable and we can safely expand it by adding new true facts to the
knowledge-base, whereas, if we had, say, the formula :2 there, then adding,
at some point, the knowledge  would make the knowledge-base intuitively
inconsistent.

De nition 2.4 Let KB be a knowledge-base and w be a world. We say

that a sentence  is true in KB with respect to w, | and write KB j=w ,
i one of the following conditions holds:
  is atomic and j=w 
  = : and KB 6j=w 
  =  _  and KB j=w  or KB j=w 
  = 2 and for every possible world u for KB , KB j=u 
  = 9x(x) and, for some constant c 2 C , KB j=w (c).
And we say that a sentence  is (simply) true in KB , | and write KB j= ,
i for every possible world w for KB , KB j=w . In other words,  is true
in KB i KB j=w 2 for any (or some) w.
5

Thus, intuitively, 2 is true if we know that , where knowing  means
that the truth of  follows exclusively from our knowledge-base, so that it
doesn't matter which of the possible worlds is the real world.
Note that if  is a pure sentence, then its truth in KB with respect to w
does not depend on KB and KB j=w  i j=w .

3 The constructive language
The constructive language Lc, whose formulas will be referred to as constructive formulas, is the fragment of L where formulas are allowed to contain 9x
only if it is immediately followed by 2.
And a constructive knowledge-base is a knowledge-base consisting only of
constructive formulas.
For a philosophy on why this fragment is natural and what it is good for
see the Introduction.
Another way to present the constructive language is to take the full language L without any syntactic constraints but change the semantics of it so
that 9x is simply understood as 9x2. This might look more impressive but
not quite fair, and we will not do that.
The above syntactic constraint may seem too inconvenient: nesting of
quantiers induces nesting of modal operators, and the meaning of a formula
with deeply nested 2's becomes not very intuitive. However, one can show
that every such formula is logically equivalent to a formula without nested
modal operators. This is natural taking into account that our modal operator
is in fact an S 5-modality which, as it is well known, allows to eliminate
nesting of 2's.
Also, theorem 3.1 below establishes that the constructive language has
the same expressive power as the much bigger language called the relaxed
constructive language, Lrc , which is dened as the fragment of L where,
whenever 9x is applied to a (sub)formula (x), all free occurrences of x in
the latter should be in the scope of 2.
We say that two formulas (x1 : : : xn) and  (x1 : : : xn), whose all
free variables are among x1 : : : xn, are (logically) equivalent, | and write
(x1 : : : xn)  (x1 : : : xn), i for every knowledge-base KB , world w and
tuple c1 : : : cn of constants,
KB j=w (c1 : : : cn) , KB j=w  (c1 : : : cn):
6

For two sublanguages L1 and L2 of L we read L1 L2 as saying that
there is an eective function f : L1 ! L2, called an interpreter, such that
for every formula  2 L1,  f ().
And we say that L1 and L2 are equivalent (in expressive power), i L1
L2 and L2 L1.

Theorem 3.1 The languages Lc and Lrc are equivalent.
(Proof is given in Section 8.)
In view of this theorem, it suces to study only Lc , and we can safely
use the more relaxed formulas of Lrc , viewing them as shorthands for their
equivalent Lc-formulas and entrusting their legalization to the interpreter.
Allowing only constructive knowledge-bases means that the knowledgebases (unlike queries) we consider cannot use quantiers, because a constructive formula containing a quantier should also contain a 2, whereas a
knowledge-base should consist of only pure formulas. This, too, may seem
restrictive. However, the eect of external universal quantiers in a constructive knowledge-base can be achieved by using free variables (which, we know,
is legal), and most of the basic scientic or everyday knowledge, | whether
it be general rules or individual facts, | does not require any other sort of
quantication.
E.g., where A(x y z) means x + y = z and S (x y) means x = y (i.e.
x+1 = y), the recursive denition of addition in terms of successor: 0+y = y
x + y = (x + y) , | can be captured by the constructive knowledge-base
consisting of the following two formulas:
 A(0 y y )
 S (x1 x2) ^ S (z1 z2) ^ A(x1 y z1) ! A(x2 y z2).
To see possible applications of our logic in knowledge-base or database
systems, consider an example knowledge-base of a dating service, which consists of the following constructive formulas:
0

0

0
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1. LIKES (Jon x) $ BLONDE (x) ^ GOODLOOKING(x) (a necessary and sucient condition for Jon to like someone is that the someone
is blonde and good-looking)
2. LIKES (Bob x) ! BLONDE (x) (Bob likes only blondes)
3. LIKES (Bob x) ! ASIAN (x) (Bob likes only Asians)
4. ASIAN (x) ! :BLONDE (x) (no Asian is blonde)
5. BLONDE (Ann)
6. GOODLOOKING(Ann)
7. ASIAN (Sue)
8. BLONDE (Peg).
Is there an undoubted match for Jon? This query is expressedby
9x2LIKES (Jon x)
and a system based on our logic would answer \YES" to this question. Then,
as I promised that existential quantier was going to be constructive in our
logic, we could condently ask the system to nd a particular x for which
2LIKES (Jon x) holds, and we would get 2LIKES (Jon Ann) (Jon will
denitely like Ann), so we would recommend Jon to meet Ann. We will also
infer 3LIKES (Jon Peg) (Jon might like Peg), so that it makes sense for Jon
to try to nd out more about Peg. And we will infer 2:LIKES (Jon Sue)
(Jon denitely will not like Sue), so Jon should not waste time on Sue. As
for Bob, he will never nd a match unless he reconsiders his taste: we can
infer the (relaxed constructive) sentence 8x:3LIKES (Bob x).

4 Logic CKN

We now describe a sequent calculus CKB . The singularity of CKN is that
it has two sorts, | positive and negative, | of sequents.
A sequent is a triple ; )  (positive sequent) or ; 6)  (negative
sequent), where ; is a constructive knowledge-base and  is a nite set of
constructive sentences.
8

The intended meaning of ; )  (resp. ; 6) ) is that the disjunction
of the elements of  is (resp. is not) true in the knowledge-base ;.
\Level-3 sequent" is a synonym of \sequent".
A level-2 sequent is a sequent containing only pure formulas.
A level-1 sequent is a sequent containing only pure sentences.
Finally, a level-0 sequent is a sequent containing only atomic sentences.
By the standard abuse of notation, if  is a set of formulas and  is a
formula, we will write \ " or \ " for   fg.
Without loss of generality we may assume that C = f0 : : : ng or C =
f0 1 2 : : :g. Then we say that a constant c is active in a sequent S , if c
occurs in some formula of S or c is the least constant not occurring in S .
And c is strictly active, if c occurs in S or there are no constants in S and
c = 0.
The inference rules listed below have the form

S1 : : : Sn
S0

possibly n = 0, and possibly with some additional conditions on S0 S1 : : : Sn .
S0 is called the conclusion and S1 : : : Sn the premises of the rule.
We say that a set Sq of sequents is closed under a set Rl of rules, if,
whenever

S1 : : : Sn
S0

is a rule of Rl, S0 S1 : : : Sn are sequents of the form S0 S1 : : : Sn, respectively, and they satisfy all additional conditions (if any) stated in the rule,
and if n = 0 or S1 : : : Sn 2 Sq, then S0 2 Sq.
In the rules below,  is a variable ranging over f) 6)g, so that each
rule with  in fact represents two rules, one with ) and the other with 6).
Also, all the sequents in a level-i rule (i = 0 1 2 3) are assumed to be level-i
sequents.
0

0

0

0

0

0

The logic CKN is dened as the smallest set of sequents closed under the
following rules:
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LEVEL-0 RULES (AXIOMS):

R0()):
where ; \  is nonempty.

R0(6)):
where ; \  is empty.

;)

; 6) 

LEVEL-1 RULES:

R1( :):
R1(: ):
R1( _):
R1(_ )):
R1(_ 6)):

;  :
;  : 
;  :
; :  
;  1 2  :
;  1 _ 2 
; 1 )  ; 2 )  :
; 1 _ 2 ) 

a) ; ; _1 6) 6)

1
2

b) ; ; _2 6) 6)  :
1

10

2

LEVEL-2 RULES:

R2():

; (c1) : : : (cn)  
; (x)  
where c1 : : : cn are all the strictly active constants of the conclusion.
LEVEL-3 RULES:

R3( ::):
R3( _):
R3() :_):
R3(6) :_):

;  :
;  :: 
;  1 2  :
;  1 _ 2 
; ) :1  ; ) :2  :
; ) :(1 _ 2) 

a) ; 6); :6)(:_1 ) 
1
2
R3() 2):
;)
a) ; )
2 
R3(6) 2):
R3() :2):

b) ; 6); :6)(:_2 )  :
1

;) :
b) ; )
2 

; 6)  ; 6)  :
; 6) 2 

a) ; ); :6)2 

 :
b) ; ); )
:2 
11

2

R3(6) :2):
R3() 9):

; )  ; 6)  :
; 6) :2 

; ) (c) 
; ) 9x(x) 
where c is an active constant of the conclusion.

R3(6) 9):

; 6) (c1)     ; 6) (cn ) 
; 6) 9x(x) 
where c1 : : : cn are all the active constants of the conclusion.

R3() :9):

; ) :(c1)     ; ) :(cn ) 
; ) :9x(x) 
where c1 : : : cn are all the active constants of the conclusion.

R3(6) :9):

; 6) :(c) 
; 6) :9x(x) 
where c is an active constant of the conclusion.

5 The main results

The relation KB j=  is naturally extended to KB j= , where  is any
nite set of sentences, in the following way: Let _ be the disjunction of
all the elements of . We may assume that we have an always-false atomic
sentence ? in the language and, if  is empty, understand _ as ?. Then
we dene KB j=  as KB j= _. Our original relation KB j=  is thus a
special case of KB j=  where  = fg. Notice also that KB j= ? means
nothing but that KB is inconsistent.
As CKN is in fact a deductive system (with the conclusions of the level-0
rules as axioms and all the other rules as proper rules of inference), we will
write CKN ` S for S 2 CKN .
12

Lemma 5.1 (Dual soundness of CKN ) For any sequent KB ) ,
 a) If CKN ` KB ) , then KB j= .
 b) If CKN ` KB 6) , then KB 6j= .
(Proof is given in Section 6.)

Lemma 5.2 (Syntactic completeness of CKN ) For any sequent KB ) ;,
either CKN ` KB ) ; or CKN ` KB 6) ;.
(Proof is given in Section 7.)

Theorem 5.3 CKN is decidable.
Proof: This is an immediate consequence of the above two lemmas,
taking into account that the rules of CKN are eective. End of proof.
Theorem 5.4 (Soundness and completeness of CKN ) For any sequent
KB ) ,

KB j=  i CKN ` KB ) :

Proof: The \if" part has been established in Lemma 5.1a. For the \only
if" part, suppose CKN 6` KB ) . Then, by Lemma 5.2, CKN ` KB 6)
, whence, by Lemma 5.1b, KB 6j= . End of proof.
Fact 5.5 (Constructiveness of 9) There is an eective method which, for
any constructive knowledge-base KB and constructive sentence 9x(x) with
KB j= 9x(x), nds a constant c such that KB j= (c).

Proof: If KB j= 9x(x), then, by 5.4, CKN proves KB ) 9x(x).
The last rule in that proof can be only R3() 9), which means that CKN `
KB ) (c) for some constant c active in KB ) 9x(x). Check whether
CKN ` KB ) (c) for each such constant c, and return a c for which you
get a positive answer. In view of the decidability of CKN , this can be done
eectively. End of proof.
13

6 Proof of Lemma 5.1

We proceed by induction on the length of a CKN -proof of the sequent.
KB )  or KB 6)  should be the conclusion of one of the 26 rules of
CKN , and, correspondingly, we need to consider 26 cases.
For better readability, we will identify  with _.
Recall that when  is a pure sentence (and so are all the formulas in
level-0 and level-1 rules, as well as the instances of formulas in level-2 rules),
then KB j=w  i j=w .
Case R0()): Let  2 ; \  (since ; \  is nonempty in this rule, such
an  exists). Then, for every possible world w for ;, we have j=w , which
implies that ; j=  because  is a disjunct of .
Case R0(6)): Let w be the world such that, for every atomic sentence
, we have j=w  i  2 ;. Thus, w is a possible world for ;. On the other
hand, 6j=w  because, since ; \  is empty, for no disjunct  of  do we have
j=w  . Thus, ; 6j= .
Case R1() :): Suppose ;  j=  (the induction hypothesis). We need
to show that ; j= : . Let w be an arbitrary possible world for ;. It
suces to show that j=w : . If j=w :, we are done otherwise we have
j=w , which means that w is a possible world for ; , whence (as ;  j= )
j=w , and we are done again.
Case R1(6) :): Suppose ;  6j=  (the induction hypothesis). We need
to show that ; 6j= : . Let w be a possible world for ;  such that 6j=w .
But notice that 6j=w : and, therefore, 6j=w : , which (as we deal with
pure sentences) means that ; 6j= : .
Cases of the remaining level-1 rules are similar.
Case R2()): It suces to observe that every possible world for ; (x)
is a possible world for ; (c1) : : : (cn ).
Case R2(6)): Suppose ; (c1 ) : : : (cn ) 6j= . We need to show that
; (x) 6j= . Let w be a possible world for ; (c1 ) : : : (cn ) such that

14

. For every formula  , let  denote the result of replacing, in  ,
every constant c 62 fc1 : : : cn g by c1. Let u be the world such that for every
atomic sentence  , j=u  i j=w  . It is easy to verify, by induction on the
complexity of , that for any (pure constructive) sentence ,
6j=w





j=u  i j=w

:

(1)



Therefore, since  =  and 6j=w , we have 6j=u . So, it remains to
show that u is a possible world for ; (x).
First, consider an arbitrary  (x1 : : : xm) 2 ;, whose free variables are
exactly x1 : : : xm. Let d1 : : : dm be any constants. We need to show that
j=u  (d1 : : : dm ), i.e., in view of (1), that j=w  (d1 : : : dm ) . But notice
that  (d1 : : : dm) is an instance of  (x1 : : : xm), and since w is a possible
world for ;, we, indeed, have j=w  (d1 : : : dm) .
Now it remains to consider instances of (x). Suppose all the free variables of (x) are among x x1 : : : xm, so that (x) = (x x1 : : : xm). Let
d d1 : : : dm be arbitrary constants. We need to show that j=u (d d1 : : : dm),
i.e., in view of (1), that j=w (d d1 : : : dm ) . But notice that if d = ci for
some ci 2 fc1 : : : cng, then (d d1 : : : dm ) is an instance of (ci), and
otherwise it is an instance of (c1). In either case, since w is a possible world
for ; (c1 ) : : : (cn ), we have j=w (d d1 : : : dm ) .














Cases R3() ::), R3(6) ::), R3() _), R3(6) _), R3() :_),
R3(6) :_) are rather straightforward.
Case R3() 2): The subcase (b) is straightforward and for the subcase
(a) it suces to observe that ; j=  implies ; j= 2.
Case R3(6) 2): Suppose ; 6j=  and ; 6j= . Let w be a possible world
for ; such that ; 6j=w . Observe that then ; 6j=w 2 . Hence, ; 6j= 2 .
Case R3() :2): The subcase (b) is straightforward and for the subcase
(a) it suces to observe that ; 6j=  implies ; j= :2.
Case R3(6) :2): Similar to case R3(6) 2).
Case R3() 9) is straightforward.
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Case R3(6) 9): Suppose ; 6j= (c1)  and ... and ; 6j= (cn ) . Since
we deal with constructive sentences, (x) must have the form 2 (x). Thus,
we have
; 6j= 
(2)
and
; 6j= 2 (c1) : : : ; 6j= 2 (cn):
(3)
We claim that
For every constant c, ; 6j= 2 (c).
(4)
Indeed, if c 2 fc1 : : : cng, then ; 6j= 2 (c) by (3). Suppose now c 62
fc1 : : : cn g. We may suppose that cn is the constant that does not appear in the conclusion of the rule. Let w be a possible world for ; such that
; 6j=w  (cn). By (3), such a world exists. Let then u be the world that evaluates every atom just as w does, only with the roles of c and cn interchanged.
Since neither c nor cn appear in ; or  (x), it is clear that u, just as w, is a
possible world for ; and also (as ; 6j=w  (cn)) we have ; 6j=u  (c). Hence,
; 6j= 2 (c) and (4) is thus proved.
Clearly (4) implies that for every world v, ; 6j=v 9x2 (x), and this,
together with (2), implies that ; 6j= 9x2 (x) .
Case R3() :9): As in the previous case, (x) must have the form
2 (x). So, suppose ; j= :2 (c1)  and ... and ; j= :2 (cn) . If ; j= ,
then ; j= 9x:2 (x)  and we are done. Otherwise, let w be a world such
that ; 6j=w . Consider any ci 2 fc1 : : : cng. We have ; j=w :2 (ci) 
and ; 6j=w . Hence, ; j=w :2 (ci). Consequently, there is a possible world
u for ; such that ; 6j=u  (ci), and this implies that ; j= :2 (ci). Thus, we
have:
; j= :2 (c1) : : : ; j= :2 (cn):
Using an argument similar to the one employed in the proof of (4), we get
that for every constant c, ; j= :2 (c). This implies that ; j= :9x2 (x),
and thus ; j= :9x2 (x) .
Case R3(6) :9) is simple.

Lemma 5.1 is proved.
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7 Proof of Lemma 5.2

Dene the complexity of a formula  as the number of occurrences of logical
operators in  plus the number of distinct free variables of . Next, dene
the complexity of a sequent S as the innite sequence ha0 a1 : : :i, where each
ai is the number of formulas of S of complexity i. Dene the well-ordering
relation  on such complexities by: ha0 a1 : : :i  hb0 b1 : : :i i there is i
such that ai < bi and, for all j with j > i, aj = bj .1
Now we can prove the lemma by induction on the complexity of KB ) .
Suppose KB )  is a level-0 sequent. KB \  is either empty or
nonempty. In the rst case CKN ` KB 6)  by R0(6)), and in the second
case CKN ` KB )  by R0()).
Suppose now KB )  is a level-i sequent but not level-(i ; 1) sequent
for some i 2 f1 2 3g. Note that then it matches the conclusion of one of
the level-i rules with a positive sequent in the conclusion. There are thus
12 cases to consider: R1() :), R1(: )), R1() _), R1(_ )), R2()),
R3() ::), R3() _), R3() :_), R3() 2), R3() :2), R3() 9),
R3() :9). We will consider only one of them, R1() :), as an example,
and all the other cases can be handled in a rather similar way.
So, suppose KB )  is a level-1 sequent of the form ; ) :  , where
(we may suppose) : 62  . If CKN does not prove this sequent, then, in
view of R1() :), CKN 6` ;  )  . Note that ;  )  has a strictly
lower complexity than ; ) :  . Therefore, by the induction hypothesis,
CKN ` ;  6)  . But then, by R1(6)), CKN ` ; 6) :  .
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Lemma 5.2 is proved.

8 Proof of Theorem 3.1

Let us say that two formulas  and  are mutually safe if they have exactly
the same free variables, and for every such variable x, if all free occurrences
of x in  are in the scope of 2, then so are they in  , and vice versa.
We will say that  and  are safely equivalent, | and write 
 , if
 and  are mutually safe and   .
1 Thus,  is the standard ordering relation on ordinals less than !! , where each complexity ha0  a1 a2 : : :i is represented by the ordinal : : : + a2  !2 + a1  !1 + a0  !0 .

17

The following lemma can be veried by a routine analysis of the appropriate denitions, and we state it without a proof:
Lemma 8.1 Let  and  be any formulas of L and x be any variable.
1. If 
 and the formula A( ) is the result of replacing  by  in
the formula A(), then A()
A( ).
2. If  $  is a classical propositional tautology, then   if, at the
same time,  and  are mutually safe, then 
.
3. 9x( _  )
9x _ 9x .
4. If  does not contain x free, then 9x( ^  )
 ^ 9x .
5. 2( ^  )
2 ^ 2 .
6. 22
2.
7. 2:2
:2.
8. 29x2
9x2.
9. 2:9x2
:9x2.
We now start proving Theorem 3.1. Lc Lrc holds trivially, so we only
need to show that Lrc Lc .
Let  be an arbitrary formula of Lrc. Below we give an interpreter's
strategy converting  into a safely equivalent constructive formula. The
correctness of this strategy is veried by induction on the complexity of .
We will be using 8.1.1 without explicitly referring to it.
If  is atomic, return  unchanged.
If  = :, then convert  into a safely equivalent constructive formula
 (which, by the induction hypothesis, can be done), and return : . By
8.1.1, :
: .
Similarly if  =  _  or  = 2.
0

0

0

Now, suppose  = 9x. First convert  into a safely equivalent constructive formula 1. Next, convert 1 into a formula 2 such that  $ 2 is a
tautology and
2 = 1 _ : : : _ n
18

where, for each 1  i  n,

i = 1i ^ : : : ^ ki

i
^ 1i ^ : : : ^ m

i

i

where each ji is an atom with or without negation, and each ji is of the
form 2 , :2 , 9y2 or :9y2 . That is, convert 1 into a tautologically
equivalent disjunctive normal form, where formulas of the form 2 and 9y2
are treated as propositional atoms. Naturally, we suppose that each such
\atom" actually has an occurrence in 1 and that occurrence is not in the
scope of a non-Boolean operator (9 or 2). In view of this, note that
no ji contains x,

(5)

for otherwise 1 would have an occurrence of x not in the scope of 2 and (as
1 and  are mutually safe) so would have , which would contradict our
assumption that 9x is a formula of Lrc.
Clearly 1 and 2 are mutually safe and therefore, by 8.1.2, 2
1 ,
whence 2
. Note also that, since 1 is constructive, so is every (ji
and) ji .
For each 1  i  n, let

i = 1i ^ : : : ^ ki

i

i ):
^ 9x2( 1i ^ : : : ^ m
i

Thus, i is constructive. We claim that

i

9xi:

(6)

To show this, rst note that, by (5) and 8.1.4,
9xi

By 8.1.6-9,
whence, by 8.1.5,

1i ^ : : : ^ ki

i ):
^ 9x( 1i ^ : : : ^ m
i

1

i ^ ::: ^ i
mi

2 1i ^ : : : ^ 2 mi

i ^ :::^ i
mi

2( 1i ^ : : : ^

1

Hence,

i

i

i )
9x( 1i ^ : : : ^ m

i
mi ):

i )
9x2( 1i ^ : : : ^ m

i

i

19

(7)

which, together with (7), implies that i
Let
In view of (6),
whence, by 8.1.3,

9xi.

(6) is thus proved.

 = 1 _ : : : _ n:
0



0



0

9x1 _ : : : _ 9xn
9x(1 _ : : : _ n )

i.e. 
9x2. But we know that 2
. Hence, 
9x. And as
the i's are constructive,  is constructive, too.
So, let the interpreter return  for our initial formula 9x.
0

0

0

0

This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
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